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Abstract In this paper we revisit the Dutch disease paying particular attention to the
role of specific factors of production and capital stock dynamics. The main insight is
that if the natural resource rich windfall is substantial but not large enough for the
country to become a rentier, capital goods must be produced at home and adjustment
to natural resource windfall takes time. It takes time to build this home-grown
capital. Specific factors are crucial to explain the dynamic responses of the real
exchange rate, capital intensities and wages in response to a natural resource
windfall. If a country is small and the windfall is large, it may be able to import
capital and migrant labour in which case the Dutch disease can be avoided.
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1 Introduction
The experiences of resource rich countries have been very heterogeneous. Some
have harnessed their resource wealth to boost their economic performance and others
have done worse (e.g., van der Ploeg 2010a). Still, many resource-rich countries
have fared badly and this has been coined the Dutch disease. Abstracting from
political economy, corruption, conflict and other non-economic explanations, the
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most popular hypothesis of the Dutch disease has been that a resource bonanza
induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, contraction of the traded sector and
expansion of the non-traded sectors. Early policy contributions highlight the
appreciation of the real exchange rate and the resulting process of de-
industrialization induced by the increase in oil exports in Britain (Forsyth and Kay
1980). The idea behind this Dutch disease is that the extra wealth generated by the
sale of natural resources induces appreciation of the real exchange rate and an
ensuing contraction of the traded sector (Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984). For
the longer run effects one must allow capital and labour to be mobile across sectors
and move beyond the specific factors framework. In an open economy Heckscher-
Ohlin framework with competitive labour, capital and product markets, no resource
use in production and constant returns to scale in the production of traded and non-
traded goods, a natural resource windfall induces a higher (lower) wage-rental ratio
if the non-traded sector is more (less) labour-intensive than the traded sector. There
is a rise in the relative price of non-traded goods leading to an expansion of the non-
traded sector and a contraction of the traded sector. Labour and capital then shift
from the traded to the non-traded sectors. More interesting are the effects of a
resource boom in a dynamic dependent economy with adjustment costs for
investment and costly sectoral reallocation of capital between non-traded and traded
sectors (Morshed and Turnovsky 2004). It is then more costly to transform one form
of existing capital into another, since this involves demolition. This way one has
factor specificity for each sector in the short run and factor mobility across sectors in
the long run. An advantage of this approach is that in the short and medium run the
real exchange rate is no longer fully determined by the supply side and does not
adjust instantaneously. If a greater fraction of resource revenues is saved, we will
argue that the initial appreciation of the real exchange rate will be less and will
eventually be reversed.
What happens if the exploitation sector uses labour and capital as factor inputs?
Apart from the hitherto discussed spending effects of a resource boom, there are also
resource movement effects (Corden and Neary 1982). De-industrialization occurs on
account of the usual appreciation of the real exchange rate (the spending effect), but
also due to the labour drawn out of both the non-traded and traded sectors towards
the resource sector (the resource movement effect). The longer run where both
factors of production (labour and capital) are mobile between the traded and non-
traded sectors and the resource sector only uses labour can be analysed with a mini-
Heckscher-Ohlin economy for the traded and non-traded sectors. The Rybczinski
theorem states that the movement of labour out of the non-resource towards the
resource sectors causes output of the capital-intensive non-resource sector to expand.
This may lead to the paradoxical result of pro-industrialization if capital-intensive
manufacturing constitutes the traded sector, despite some offsetting effects arising
from the de-industrialization effects arising from an appreciation of the real
exchange rate (Corden and Neary 1982). If the non-traded sector is more capital
intensive, the real exchange rate depreciates if labour is needed to secure the
resource windfall; the Rybczinski theorem then says that the non-traded sector
expands and the traded sector contracts. This increase in relative supply of non-
traded goods fuels depreciation of the real exchange rate. Real exchange
depreciation may also result from a boost to natural resource exports if the traded
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sector is relatively capital intensive and capital is needed for the exploitation of
natural resources (Neary and Purvis 1982). Since less capital is available for the
traded sector, less labour is needed and thus more labour is available for the non-
traded sector. This may lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate. This also
occurs if the income distribution is shifted to consumers with a low propensity to
consume non-traded goods (Corden 1984).
We reconsider the above theory of the Dutch disease with a simple dynamic,
three-sector, specific-factors, international trade model of the Dutch disease. The
model supposes that all markets clear instantaneously and that firms operate under
perfect competition. To put some structure on our analysis, we make the following
simplifying assumptions: the non-traded sector (services) uses only labour and
possibly another fixed factor, manufacturing sector (the non-resource traded sector)
uses labour and capital, capital is produced by the non-traded sector, and the
production of natural resources requires no labour capital or other inputs. The main
insight we derive from this model is that if the natural resource windfall is
substantial but not large enough for the country to become a rentier, capital goods
must be produced at home and adjustment to natural resource windfall takes time.
The result is an appreciation of the real exchange as factors are shifted from the non-
traded sectors to manufacturing. This sluggish adjustment process is a result of the
absorption constraints in the non-traded sector which imply that it takes time to build
this home-grown capital. A muchmore detailed analysis of this can be found in van der
Ploeg and Venables (2010). Specific factors are also crucial to explain the dynamic
responses of capital intensities and wages in response to a natural resource windfall,
which do not occur in the Dutch disease model without specific factors (e.g., Sachs
and Warner 1995, 1997). The reason is that with perfect international capital mobility
and no specific factors of production, the wage, the relative price of non-traded goods
and the capital intensities in the traded and non-traded sectors are pinned down by the
world interest rate. If a country is small and the windfall is large, it will be able to
import capital and migrant labour in which case the Dutch disease can be avoided.
Another motivation of our paper is that we believe that for many developing
countries with a poorly developed manufacturing base the problems with a resource
windfall are not so much to do with the temporary loss of learning by doing and the
ensuing drop in economic growth resulting from the decline of manufacturing (cf.,
van Wijnbergen 1984; Krugman 1987; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997), but are much
more a result of the non-traded sector having insufficient capacity to meet the boom
in demand for home-grown capital (cf., van der Ploeg and Venables 2010). The
temporary rise in the price of non-traded goods simply reflects absorption constraints
in many developing economies and will disappear once sufficient home-grown
capital has been produced.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 offers a quick review of the
standard theory of the Dutch disease with no capital accumulation but with specific
factors. Section 3 extends this theory to allow for learning by doing and endogenous
growth, which seems more relevant for developed economies that are rich in natural
resources. Section 4 then presents our alternative dynamic story of absorption
constraints and Dutch disease, which applies more to developing resource-rich
economies. Section 5 then briefly reviews some empirical evidence for the various
theories of Dutch disease. Section 6 discusses policy rules for best harnessing
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foreign exchange windfalls in a model with overlapping generations and no specific
factors and section 7 concludes.
2 Dutch disease and de-industrialisation: No capital accumulation
We illustrate the mechanics of the Dutch disease, i.e., that the extra wealth generated by
the sale of natural resources on world markets induces appreciation of the real exchange
rate and contraction of the traded sector (Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984), with
the Salter-Swan model of a two-sector economy with a resource windfall, abstracting
from capital accumulation, international investment and financial assets. Export of
resources thus equals net imports of traded goods, that is we have
HTQE ¼ CT  HTF LTð Þ; ð1Þ
whereQ denotes the world price of natural resources, E the volume of exports of natural
resources, CT consumption of traded goods, LT employment in the traded sector, HT
productivity in the traded and natural resource sectors and HT F(LT) output of the traded
sector (with F′>0, F′′≤0). Non-traded goods market equilibrium requires that
CN ¼ HNG LNð Þ; ð2Þ
where CN denotes consumption of non-traded goods, LN employment in the non-traded
sector, HN productivity in the non-traded sector and HN G(LN) output of the non-traded
sector (with F′>0, F′′≤0). With exogenous labour supply of one unit and labour
mobility between traded and non-traded sectors, labour market equilibrium requires that
LT þ LN ¼ 1: ð3Þ
Households maximize utility U(CN,CT) subject to the budget constraint
PCN þ CT ¼ Y ; ð4Þ
where P is the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods and
national income is defined by
Y  PHNG LNð Þ þ HTF LTð Þ þ HTQE: ð5Þ
Optimality requires that the efficiency condition UN/UT = P must hold. With CES
utility, we then have
CN ¼ Y= 1þ P"1
 
P; ð6Þ
where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods.
The equilibrium condition for equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods,
HNG LNð Þ ¼ CN ¼ Y= 1þ P"1
 
¼ PHNG LNð Þ þ HTF LTð Þ þ HTQEY½ = P þ P"ð Þ; ð7Þ
yields the following relationship:
P" ¼ H F 1 LNð Þð Þ þ QE½ =G LNð Þ; ð8Þ
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where H ≡ HT/HN is the productivity of the traded and resource sectors relative to
that of the non-traded sector. This equation corresponds to the NT-locus in Fig. 1 and
describes those combinations of the real exchange rate P and the share of labour
employed in the non-traded sector LN that ensure clearing of the market for non-
traded goods. The NT-locus slopes downwards, since a higher P is associated with
relatively lower demand for non-traded goods and thus with fewer workers
employed in the non-traded sector. Labour mobility between traded and non-traded
sectors requires that labour is paid the same in each sector, so that the value of the
marginal product of labour is equalized. This yields the LM-curve:
PG0 LNð Þ ¼ HF0 1 LNð Þ; ð9Þ
which gives those combinations of the real exchange rate P and the share of labour
employed in the non-traded sector LN that ensure labour market equilibrium. The
LM-curve slopes upward. A higher relative price of non-traded goods P pushes up
the value of the marginal product of employment in the non-traded sector, so
employment in the traded sector must decline in order to push up the marginal
product of labour in the traded sector.
Higher natural resource revenue QE boosts national income and demand. Hence,
the NT-locus shifts upwards, the LM-locus is unaffected and equilibrium in Fig. 1
shifts from A to A′. The short-run consequences of higher resource revenues are thus
appreciation of the real exchange rate (a higher relative price of non-traded goods P),
decline of the traded sector and expansion of the non-traded sector. Labour shifts
from the exposed to the sheltered sectors. This boosts both consumption and output
of non-traded goods. The rise in consumption of traded goods and the contraction in
Relative 
price of 
non-
traded 
goods 
Fraction of labour in non-traded sector 
LM
LM
A
A
NT
NT
NT
A
B
Fig. 1 Natural resource dependence reduces competitiveness. Key: a resource boom shifts A to A′, so a
shift from the traded to non-traded sector and real appreciation. With time relative productivity of the
traded declines if the elasticity of substitution in demand goods is less than unity. This shifts the
equilibrium from A′ to A′′ and eventually to b. In the long run there is real depreciation and the allocation
of labour is returned to its original level
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the production of traded goods is made possible by additional imports financed by
the increase in resource revenues. National income rises by more than natural
resource revenues dY ¼ HTd QEð Þ þ CNdP > HTd QEð Þð Þ. The natural resource
bonanza thus increases welfare.
3 De-industrialisation and Dutch disease: Growth and learning by doing
If the traded sector is the engine of growth and benefits most from learning by doing
and other positive externalities, non-resource export sectors temporarily hit by
worsening competitiveness are unable to fully recover when resources run out. This
may result from learning by doing captured by future productivity of the traded
sector increasing with current production of traded goods (van Wijnbergen 1984) or
with cumulative experience (Krugman 1987). If human capital spill-over effects in
production induce endogenous growth in both traded and non-traded sectors, natural
resource exports lower employment in the traded sector, hamper learning by doing
and stunt economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997).
To illustrate how a resource boom affects relative productivity growth of the
traded and non-traded sector, the adverse effects of the Dutch disease on growth
have been illustrated with a dynamic two-sector economy without capital
accumulation, absence of current account dynamics and balanced trade (Torvik
2001). This analysis supposes that both traded and non-traded sectors contribute to
learning. A foreign exchange windfall arising from resource exports then leads to
appreciation of the real exchange rate in the short run, but real depreciation in the
long run. To illustrate these results within the framework presented in section 2, we
allow productivity growth in manufacturing and the non-traded sectors to increase
with the number employed in those sectors and suppose that learning by doing is
more substantial in manufacturing than in the non-traded sector. Suppose also that
the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods in consumption ε
is less than unity. A fall in the relative productivity of manufacturing, i.e., H ≡ HT/
HN, induces a depreciation of the real exchange rate (lower P) and, given ε < 1, a
smaller non-traded sector (lower LN). Labour thus shifts from the non-traded sector
to manufacturing. After an increase in the natural resource windfall, increase in QE,
the economy gradually converges to the lower steady-state value of H, so over time
productivity of the traded sector declines relative to that of the non-traded sector.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We have already seen in section 2 that higher natural resource exports lead
initially to real appreciation and expansion of the non-traded sector (the shift from A
to A′ in Fig. 1). Over time relative productivity of the traded relative to that of the
non-traded sector H declines gradually. This induces gradual depreciations of the
real exchange rate and falls in labour use in the non-traded sector, and corresponds to
the movement from A′ to A′′ and eventually to B in Fig. 1. In the end this
completely chokes off the initial expansion of the non-traded sector and eliminates
the boom of the traded sector through gradual depreciation of the real exchange rate.
The new steady-state level of production has also moved in favour of the non-traded
sector, not due to reallocation of labour, but due to the relative fall in the productivity
of the traded sector.
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So although a temporary windfall has no long-run impact on the allocation of labour
across manufacturing and the non-traded sector, it does lead to a temporary fall in the
real exchange rate and the rate of economic growth and thus to a permanent loss in
output. This is fundamental to the mainstream theory of the Dutch disease. Other
theories based on endogenous growth and learning by doing (Sachs and Warner 1995,
1997) also have a temporary drop in the rate of growth, but due to the absence of
specific fixed factors have no transient effects on the real exchange rate, the wage or
capital intensities as all of these are pinned down by the world interest rate.
4 Dutch disease dynamics and de-industrialisation: Absorption constraints
Our objective here is to present an alternative model of de-industrialisation and
Dutch disease, which relies on absorption constraints and capital stock dynamics
rather than on learning-by-doing externalities. To do this we allow for capital and
labour as factors of production and also suppose that there are specific factors to
ensure that the natural resource windfall induces realistic dynamics of the real
exchange rate and the wage. We also suppose asset dynamics and a perfect
international capital market and assume that households are infinitely lived and
follow the permanent income hypothesis. Assume therefore a small open dependent
economy with perfect access to the international capital market. We suppose that the
traded good is the numeraire. To keep matters as simple as possible, we suppose that
production in the traded sector only used labour. Normalizing productivity at one we
have:
YT ¼ LT andW ¼ 1: ð10Þ
The non-traded sector has the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
YN ¼ KaLN 1a; 0 < a < 1; ð11Þ
where K indicates the capital produced by the non-traded sector (‘home-grown’
capital). Profit maximization yields the demand for labour in the non-traded sector:
LN ¼ K 1 að ÞP½ 1=a; ð12Þ
where P is the relative price of non-traded goods. Labour market equilibrium then
gives:
LT ¼ 1 K 1 að ÞP½ 1=a: ð13Þ
Output of non-traded goods is given by:
YN ¼ K 1 að ÞP½ ð1aÞ=a: ð14Þ
We denote the unit-cost function for producing capital goods by:
cðPÞ ¼ Pg ð15Þ
with 0 < γ < 1 the share of non-traded goods in the production of home-grown
capital. If the domestically produced traded good (or indeed the perfect substitute
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produced abroad) is not necessary for the production of home-grown capital, γ =1
and c(P) = P. This special case highlights the absorption constraints best, since the
windfall cannot be used to import capital goods from abroad. They must be fully
produced at home.
Profit maximization requires that the marginal product of capital, r(P), must equal
the rental change, r*, plus the depreciation charge, δ, minus the expected capital gains:
rðPÞ ¼ a 1 að ÞP½ ð1aÞ=aþr»þ d  cðPÞ=cðPÞ: ð16Þ
Preferences are homothetic and eðPÞ ¼ Pb; 0 < b < 1, denotes the unit-
expenditure function, hence consumption is non-traded goods is given by:
CN ¼ e0ðPÞU ; ð17Þ
where U denotes real consumption (or utility). Equilibrium on the market for non-
traded goods is given by:
CN þ c0ðPÞI ¼ YN ; ð18Þ
where I ¼ K þ dKdenotes gross investment. The representative consumer max-
imizes utility,
R1
0 lnðUÞ expðrtÞdt;subject to the present-value budget constraint of
the economy:Z 1
0
eðPÞU þ cðPÞI½  expðr»tÞdt  F0 þ V0 þ
Z 1
0
ðYT þ PYN Þ expðr»tÞdt; ð19Þ
where F indicates foreign assets (bonds) and V the present value of natural resource
revenues (i.e., natural resource wealth). The present-value budget constraint states that
the present value of the stream of current and future consumption and investment
spending on traded and non-traded goods cannot exceed initial foreign assets plus
initial resource wealth plus the present value of current and future traded and non-
traded production. If we set r* = ρ, the optimality condition for the consumer is:
1=U ¼ leðPÞ; ð20Þ
where the marginal utility of wealth l has to be constant over time. At the time the
resource windfall becomes known (upward jump in V0), l jumps down and stays at
this lower value forever after. A resource windfall thus corresponds to an
unanticipated, permanent fall in the marginal utility of wealth l.
The adjustment path follows from the system of differential equations describing,
respectively, equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods and equity arbitrage:

K ¼ K ð1 aÞPð Þ1aa  b
lP
 
P1g
g
 dK; Kð0Þ ¼ K0; ð21Þ

P ¼ r» þ d  a ð1 aÞPð Þ1aa
h i P
g
; Pð0Þ free: ð22Þ
The phase diagram corresponding to this economic system is given in Fig. 2.
The steady-state value of P is independent of l, but the steady-state value of K
increases after downward and permanent jump in l induced by a windfall of foreign
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exchange. Note that as the share of traded goods in capital goods vanishes, γ → 0,
the capital stock adjusts immediately to a natural resource windfall. As a result of the
downward jump in l, there is an immediate and permanent upward jump in K and
there is no need for the real exchange rate to appreciate whatsoever. However, much
capital in modern economies (think of nurses and teachers as well as infrastructure)
must be home-grown and cannot be imported. Consequently, γ is closer to one and
absorption constraints will manifest themselves. This may be seen from the saddle-
path diagram given in Fig. 2.
The optimal response to a windfall is for the real exchange to appreciate on
impact signalling labour to shift from the traded to the non-traded sector and shifting
demand from non-traded to traded goods. Over time, investment induces a gradual
expansion in home-grown capital which permits a gradual reversal of the initial
appreciation of the real exchange rate. The resulting temporary boost to the return on
capital in the non-traded sector r(P) is in line with the anticipated capital losses on
those capital goods (as over time the relative price of investment goods c(P) will fall
and return to its original level). The windfall results in an immediate and permanent
increase in the consumption of traded goods, but consumption of non-traded goods
increases on impact and subsequently continues to increase towards its new steady-
state level.
Home-grown capital also jumps up on impact and then continues to rise to its new
steady-state level. Due to the gradual increase in consumption as supply constraints
are gradually relaxed, the total stock of assets increases by more than the windfall.
Hence, there is initial saving (parking funds abroad) relative to the permanent
income hypothesis. Van der Ploeg and Venables (2010) provide a much more general
analysis allowing for capital accumulation in the traded sector as well and
highlighting the impossibility of shifting capital between the two sectors once it
has been installed. One issue that becomes apparent from this more general analysis
is that once international migration is allowed and/or capital imported from abroad
can be substituted for home-grown capital, adjustment is immediate and the
symptoms of the Dutch disease disappear.
P 
0P =
0K =
K
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S
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Fig. 2 Absorption constraints
and Dutch disease dynamics
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A final comment about the model we have discussed is in order. We have
assumed that the natural resource windfall corresponds to a sudden increase in
income from abroad. It thus requires no labour or capital inputs to produce a
resource-based good that turns the natural wealth of the country into a rent-
generating activity. If labour and capital are needed to produce a resource windfall,
there may not be Dutch disease effects. Apart from the hitherto discussed resource
spending effects leading to appreciation of the real exchange rate and contraction of
the traded sector, there will be resource movement effects resulting from labour
being drawn out of the traded and the non-traded sectors into the resource sector as
discussed in Corden and Neary (1982). If the traded sector is capital intensive, the
Rybczinksi theorem states that these latter effects will lead to an expansion of the
traded sector. Hence, if these latter effects are strong enough they may outweigh the
contraction of the traded sector resulting from spending effects. Resource windfalls
then lead to pro-industrialization.
5 Empirical evidence for Dutch disease effects
Before we discuss how the presence of Dutch disease might affect the optimal way
of harnessing windfalls of resource revenue, we first briefly assess whether there is
any direct empirical support for Dutch disease effects and then whether there is any
indirect support. Recent empirical evidence for 135 countries for the period 1975–
2007 indicates that the response to a resource windfall is to save about 30%,
decrease non-resource exports by 35–70%, and increase non-resource imports by 0–
35% (Harding and Venables 2010). These findings hold in pure cross-sections of
countries (averages across one, two, three or four decades), in pooled panels of
countries, and in panel estimations including dynamics and country fixed effects.
Another empirical study uses detailed, disaggregated sector data for manufacturing
and obtains similar results: a 10.0% oil windfall is on average associated with a 3.4%
fall in value added across manufacturing, but less so in countries that have
restrictions on capital flows and for sectors that are more capital intensive (Ismail
2010). Using as a counterfactual the Chenery and Syrquin (1975) norm for the size
of tradables (manufacturing and agriculture), countries in which the resource sector
accounts for more than 30% of GDP have a tradables sector 15 percentage points
lower than the norm (Brahmbhatt, et al. 2010). This empirical evidence thus seems
to offer direct empirical support for the type of Dutch disease effects highlighted in
section 2 and section 4. We now assess whether there is indirect empirical support
for Dutch disease and the resource curse.
Figure 3 indicates a negative correlation between economic growth and natural
resource dependence, but this does not say anything about causality. However, early
empirical cross-country evidence shows that resource rich countries grow on average
about one percentage point less during 1970–89 even after controlling for initial
income per capita, investments during the period, openness and rule of law (Sachs
and Warner 1995, 1997). The revised cross-country regressions explaining average
growth in real GDP per capita during 1970–90 are reported in the first regression of
Table 1. There is evidence of conditional convergence (in line with the workhorse
Solow model of economic growth), since countries with a low (log of the) level of
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initial real GDP per active member of the population catch up and grow relatively
fast. Countries with a high log ratio of real public and private gross domestic
investment to real GDP averaged over 1970–89 appear to grow faster. Countries
with a large number of years in which their economy is rated as open and whose
citizens accept the rule of law more easily (on a scale from 1 to 6) also grow faster.
Even taking account of these traditional growth determinants, there is a strong
negative effect of resource dependence (measured by the share of exports of primary
products in GNP in 1970) on growth. This is what has become known as the natural
resource curse and offers support for the theories reviewed in section 3. This
pioneering study gives no role for institutions or bureaucratic quality in explaining
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Fig. 3 Growth and natural resource dependence. Fuels, ores and metals exports in percent of merchandise
exports 1970–2002. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank
Table 1 Effects of resource dependence and institutional quality on economic growth
Annual growth in real
GDP per capita
Sachs and Warner
(1995, 1997)
Based on data in Sachs
and Warner (1995, 1997)
Mehlum et al.
(2006a)
Initial income −1.76 (8.56) −1.28 (6.65) −1.26 (6.70)
Openness 1.33 (3.35) 1.45 (3.36) 1.66 (3.87)
Resource dependence −10.57 (7.01) −6.69 (5.43) −14.34 (4.21)
Rule of law 0.36 (3.54) – –
Institutional quality – 0.6 (0.64) −1.3 (1.13)
Investments 1.02 (3.45) 0.15 (6.73) 0.16 (7.15)
Interaction term – – 15.40 (2.40)
Number of countries 71 87 87
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.69 0.71
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the curse. The second regression reported in Table 1 uses more countries, more years
and an index of institutional quality (on a scale from 0 to 1). Using the starting year
1965 rather than 1970, it confirms that resource rich economies experience slower
growth and that institutional quality is not significant at the 5 percent level.
These regressions have become the cornerstone of many discussions of the
resource curse, but can be criticized on econometric grounds. For example, the share
of resources in GNP (dependence) is potentially endogenous and, if instrumented, it
does not significantly affect growth whereas subsoil resource wealth (abundance)
does have a significant positive effect on growth (Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008).
However, natural resource wealth is also endogenous as it is calculated as the present
value of natural resource rents. If it is instrumented with the more exogenous
measure of economically recoverable reserves, there is no evidence for either a curse
or a blessing unless one allows for an indirect effect via volatility (van der Ploeg and
Poelhekke 2010). Another issue is the negative correlation between growth
performance and resource dependence, which may merely be picking up cross-
country variations in income per capita. Alternatively, if the non-resource traded
sector declines and the wage premium for education falls, resource rich economies
might invest less in education and thus the growth rate falls. Hence, adding a control
for education implies that the negative coefficient on resource dependence should
fall. Similar points apply to intermediate variables such as wars or institutional
quality, so one should be careful about drawing inferences about the speed of
convergence from the coefficient on initial income. There may also be some omitted
variable bias if a third factor say ‘underdevelopment’ is driving income as then
countries with a low income potential are measured as resource rich.
It is important to distinguish between countries with production-friendly institutions
and others with rent grabbing-friendly institutions (Mehlum et al. 2006a, b). Because it
can be shown that there will be more rent seeking following a windfall in countries
with bad institutions (e.g., Angola, Nigeria, Sudan and Venezuela, diamond-rich Sierra
Leone, Liberia and Congo, and drug states Columbia and Afghanistan) and thus a
curse, but not so in countries with strong institutions (e.g., Australia, Canada, US,
New Zealand, Iceland and Norway, and also Botswana). Later evidence indeed offers
support for the hypothesis that with good institutions the curse can be turned into a
blessing (Mehlum et al., 2006ab). The third regression in Table 1 indicates that
countries with a high enough index of institutional quality (> 14.34/15.4=0.93)
experience no curse. This holds for 15 out of the 87 countries (including the US,
Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia). Resource rich
countries with bad institutions typically are poor and remain poor. The adverse effect
of resource dependence on institutional quality and growth is particularly strong for
easily appropriable ‘point-source’ resources with concentrated production and
revenues and massive rents such as oil, diamonds, minerals and plantation crops
rather than agriculture (rice, wheat and animals) whose rents are more dispersed
throughout the economy, and with easy appropriation of rents through state institutions
(Boschini et al. 2007).
Table 2 calculates the marginal effects of one standard deviation change in
various measures of resource dependence that are increasingly technically
appropriable on the average yearly growth rate of GDP during 1975–88 for different
levels of institutional quality (from cross-country regressions with a sample of 80
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industrialised and developed countries, controlling for trade openness, average share
of investment in GDP and initial level of income per capita). Going from top to
bottom in Table 2, we see that better institutions are conducive to growth indicating
institutional appropriability. Reading Table 2 from left to right, the importance of
good institutions increases in technical appropriability of resources which confirms
technical appropriability. The curse is thus not cast in stone.
6 Harnessing natural resource windfalls in developing economies
Having established both analytically and empirically the role of non-traded or home-
grown capital in the appearance of absorption constraints and Dutch disease effects,
we now turn how absorption constraints and Dutch disease effects might influence
the optimal fiscal policy responses to a natural resource windfall.
In policy analysis one often focuses at the optimal way of harnessing a given
temporary, natural resource windfall (e.g., Collier et al. 2010). The benchmark for
this is typically based on the permanent income hypothesis, which says that
countries should borrow ahead of the windfall, pay back incurred debt and build up
sovereign wealth during the windfall and finance the permanent increase in
consumption out of the interest on the accumulated sovereign wealth after the
windfall has ceased. The IMF has often recommended resource rich countries to
put their windfalls in such a sovereign wealth fund (e.g., Davis et al. 2002). The
permanent-income fiscal rule states that the increase in primary public spending
should equal the permanent value of the windfall at the time of discovery and
builds up sufficient sovereign wealth to ensure that the interest on the fund at the
end of the windfall can sustain the permanent increase in consumption. A more
conservative fiscal rule is the bird-in-hand rule, which says that the windfall does
not serve as collateral for loans, is put in a fund, and a fixed percentage (4% in case
of Norway) is drawn from the fund to finance primary public spending. The bird-
in-hand rule is prudent in that windfalls are not valued until they are banked, but is
less successful in transferring the benefits to future generations than the permanent-
income rule.
Table 2 Marginal effects of resources on growth for varying institutional quality
Primary exports
share of GDP
Ores and metals
exports as share
of GDP
Mineral production as
share of GNP
Production of gold,
silver and diamonds
as share of GDP
Worst institutions −0.548 −0.946 −1.127 −1.145
Average institutions −0.378 0.425 0.304 0.279
Average + one s.d.
institutions
−0.288 1.152 1.062 1.183
Best institutions −0.228 1.629 1.560 1.776
Institutional quality is an average of the indexes for bureaucracy, corruption, rule of law, risk of
expropriation of private investment and repudiation of contracts by government.
Source Boschini et al. (2007)
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Figure 4 presents the bird-in-hand rule within the context of the theoretical model
presented in van der Ploeg (2010b). The main differences with the model presented
in section 4 are that it has no specific factors and thus that the real exchange rate is
not affect by the windfall of natural resource revenues, but that it does include
overlapping generations to give a meaningful role for government debt. We suppose
that the windfall lasts from period 10 to 32. As all factor prices are tied down by the
world interest rate, capital and employment in manufacturing move in tandem.
Ahead of the windfall, capital in manufacturing is run down and labour shifts from
manufacturing to the non-traded sector to make possible the increase in consumption
of non-tradables. During the windfall capital and employment in manufacturing
decline further and after the windfall they gradually rise back to their original steady-
state values. These factor movements are entirely achieved via output effects
(substitution effects are absent as the real exchange rate does not respond to the
windfall). The government does not borrow ahead of the windfall, but builds up assets
during the windfall and stops thereafter asserts are gradually winded down (as the 4%
rule implies that the fraction of government assets that is being consumed every period
exceeds the assumed world return on government assets); see the line of long dashes.
Households already borrow ahead of the windfall as can be seen from the time path of
foreign assets (indicated by f) and household assets (indicated by a).
The right panel of Fig. 4 shows the sensitivity of the consumption path to four
key parameters. First, a higher world interest rate induces an extra incentive to save
and postpone consumption. So there is less borrowing and a smaller upward jump in
consumption ahead of the windfall, but eventually the return on accumulated assets
permits higher levels of consumption after the windfall has ceased. Second, if a
greater proportion of primary public spending is spent on citizen dividends, the
whole time path of private consumption is lifted upwards while that of public
consumption is shifted downwards. Conversely, if all the windfall revenue is spent
Fig. 4 Macroeconomic Implications of the Bird-In-Hand (4%) Rule. Key: The horizontal axes give units
of time. In the left panel pk, a and f indicate the time paths for the equity value of the capital stock,
household assets and foreign assets, respectively. The right panel gives the paths for consumption c under
different assumptions (higher world interest rate, a higher proportion of the windfall spent on transfers, a
higher birth rate, and learning by doing in manufacturing)
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on public consumption, private consumption and asset holdings would be
unaffected. If furthermore neither the public nor the private sector consumes non-
tradables, the capital stock and employment in manufacturing would also not be
affected by the windfall which reminds us of our analysis of section 4. In that very
special case, the windfall is fully spent abroad with no effects on the domestic
economy whatsoever. Third, a higher birth/death rate and thus a bigger departure
from Ricardian debt neutrality implies that households discount future transfers more
heavily. As a result, consumption jumps up by a smaller amount permitting more
household saving and a higher level of future consumption. In the extreme case that
there is no debt neutrality, consumption would be completely smoothed. Fourth, with
learning-by-doing effects in manufacturing as discussed in section 3 added to the
model, the growth rate falls as labour moves from manufacturing to the non-traded
sector, and consequently the whole consumption path is shifted downwards. On
impact on the news of the discovery consumption now jumps down a little so that
employment in the traded sector rises rather than falls ahead of the windfall, but then
falls sharply when the windfall revenue pours in. Despite the temporary fall in
growth, steady-state consumption is unaffected by learning by doing.
Figure 5 gives the transient dynamics of an anticipated, temporary bonanza under the
permanent-income rule, and the bottom two panels allow us to compare with the bird-
in-hand rule. The falls in capital and employment in manufacturing are much smaller
under the permanent-income rule. Also, the increase in consumption is much less than
under the bird-in-hand rule, but lasts much longer. The government now also borrows
ahead of the windfall and accumulates less sovereign wealth than under the bird-in-hand
rule, but the fund is not depleted after the windfall to ensure that the boost to primary
public spending can be sustained forever. Since with the permanent-income rule the
government does some of the consumption smoothing for the private sector, households
need to borrow less ahead of the windfall and accumulate fewer assets during the
windfall than under the bird-in-hand rule. The sensitivity exercises shown in the top-
right panel of Fig. 5 give the same qualitative insights as the ones in Fig. 4.
The above analysis of the bird-in-hand and permanent-income rules can be
extended to allow for specific fixed factors in order to have interesting time
trajectories of the real exchange rate, wage and factor intensities (van der Ploeg
2010b). In general, one must take account of many other features of resource-rich
developing countries other than absorption constraints. For example, although
developing economies often converge on a development path, they often suffer from
capital scarcity and high interest rates resulting from premium on high levels of
foreign debt, and households do not have access to perfect capital markets. In that
case, the permanent income hypothesis is inappropriate. In contrast to transferring
much of the increment to future generations (as with the permanent-income and bird-
in-hand rules), the optimal time path for incremental consumption should be skewed
towards present generations and saving should be directed towards accumulation of
domestic private and public capital and cutting debt rather than accumulating foreign
assets (van der Ploeg and Venables 2011). The windfall then brings forward the
development path of the economy. The analysis of van der Ploeg and Venables
(2010) and section 4 suggests, however, that there may be absorption constraints so
that it might take time before sufficient home-grown capital has been accumulated to
meet the extra demand for home investment. In that case, it is optimal to park some
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of the windfall temporarily in a sovereign wealth fund until the domestic economy
has alleviated the absorption constraints.
Another issue to consider has to do with the political economy of windfalls. This
dictates that incumbents avoid putting resource revenues in a liquid sovereign wealth
fund which can be easily raided by political rivals. There is thus a bias to excessive
investment in illiquid, partisan projects, especially if the probability of being
removed from office is high (Collier et al. 2010).
7 Concluding remarks
Although the hypothesis of learning-by-doing in the traded sector may be relevant
for advanced industrialised economies, developing economies are more likely to
Fig. 5 Macroeconomic Implications of the Permanent-Income Rule. Key: The horizontal axes in each
panel give units of time. In the top-left panel pk, a, f and b indicate the time paths for the equity value of
equity, household assets, foreign assets and government debt, respectively. The top-right panel give the
time paths for consumption c for the benchmark and for various alternative scenarios (higher world
interest rate, a higher fraction of the windfall spent on transfers, and a higher birth rate). The dashed and
solid lines in the left-bottom panel give the time paths for consumption and for the permanent-income and
the bird-in-hand rules indicated by c-PI and c-BIH, respectively. Similarly, the right-bottom panel gives
the time path of government debt under these two rules
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suffer from absorption constraints in the non-traded sector especially as it is unlikely that
capital in the traded sector can easily be unbolted and shunted to the non-traded sector. It
may then be optimal to temporarily park some of the windfall in a sovereign wealth fund
until the non-traded sector has produced enough home-grown capital (infrastructure,
teachers, nurses, etc.) to alleviate absorption bottlenecks and allow a gradual rise in
consumption (see also van der Ploeg and Venables 2010). The economy experiences
temporary appreciation of the real exchange rate and other Dutch disease symptoms.
However, these are reversed as home-grown capital is accumulated.
Many countries thus find it hard to absorb a substantial and prolonged windfall of
foreign exchange, since it takes time for the non-traded sectors to accumulate ‘home-
grown’ capital. Whilst these Dutch disease bottlenecks are being resolved, it is
optimal to park the windfall revenue abroad until there is enough capacity to
sensibly invest in the domestic economy. However, fear of the fund being raided by
political rivals can induce a sub-optimal political bias towards too much partisan,
illiquid investment.
A realistic analysis of how to optimally harness natural resource windfalls
requires one to depart from Ricardian debt neutrality, because otherwise it would not
matter whether the government uses bird-in-hand or permanent-income rules. One
way of breaking neutrality is to suppose a large fraction of credit-constrained
households another way is to have overlapping generations without an operational
bequest motives. This then suggests that bird-in-hand rules lead to a lot of extra
consumption during and immediately after the windfall, but in the long run to no
extra consumption. A permanent-income rule, in contrast, has much less extra
consumption during the windfall but the increase, being financed by interest on the
sovereign wealth fund, lasts forever.
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